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Courtroom Dialogues and Feminist Legal Theory in Irish literature 
 
Róisín Á Costello 
Abstract: This article examines the use of courtroom dialogues in two of the leading works of Irish 
language literature, and how they acted, at the time of their writing, as a mechanism which permitted 
both author and audience to question societal attitudes to female agency and sexuality – and how they 
continue to facilitate such critical reflection contemporaneously. Specifically, the piece examines the 
use of courtroom dialogues in Cúirt an Mheán Oíche by Brian Merriman (CMO) written around 17802 
and in An Triail by Máiréad Ní Ghráda (AT) originally performed in 1965 and published in 1978. Both 
pieces, written nearly two centuries apart, use courtroom dialogues, and the formal mechanisms of 
testimony and cross-examination to articulate and critique the social subordination of women portrayed 
in the texts, and to question the restraints on female agency and sexuality imposed by the societies in 
which their characters exist. Through the works’ use of judicial settings and dialogues both texts 
articulate a feminist theory of law which aligns with Catherine McKinnon’s dominance theory. 




For a body of literature frequently characterised by, and located in, intensely local, and frequently rural, 
settings, the recurrence of the courtroom as a narrative device in leading works of Irish language 
literature can seem incongruous. Yet, the institutions of State, theirs actors and dialogues have 
intermittently recurred as a narrative device in Irish literary works from Párliament na mBan in the late 
1600s onwards. In particular, the use of the narrative device of the courtroom is used, to striking effect, 
by Máiréad Ní Ghráda in An Triail (AT)1 originally performed in 1965 and published in 1978 and Brian 
Merriman in Cúirt an Mheán Oíche (CMO) written around 17802. Both works use courtroom dialogues, 
and the formalities associated with courtroom proceedings to articulate and critique the social 
subordination of their central female characters, articulating a vision which is broadly aligned with the 
feminist theory of law propounded in Catherine McKinnon’s dominance theory. 
 
This piece examines and contrasts the use of the courtroom dialogues in both CMO and AT and 
establishes how they function to permit critical engagement by both author and audience with social 
attitudes to female agency and sexuality. Beginning with an examination of the editions and translations 
of both works, as well as the differing genres of both texts, the piece defends the versions relied on as 
offering the most objective translations of the original works.  
 
The subsequent sections then proceed to outline the feminist legal theories of Catherine McKinnon, 
with a particular emphasis on McKinnon’s theory of dominance before turning to address the content 
of both texts in their portrayal of femininity and social attitudes towards women. Finally, the concluding 
section, analyses how the texts examined can be read through the lens of McKinnon’s work as forming 
part of a feminist theory of law.  
 
The analysis takes as its basis the Irish language text of AT published in 1978, and which the author 
translated herself for the stage in 1966. However, no popular translation is currently available and the 
translations provided here are those of the author of this article. The choice of texts and translations in 
relation to CMO is rather more difficult. As Nic Dhiarmada notes, numerous manuscript copies were 
circulating not just in Merriman’s lifetime, but far into the nineteenth century.3 Indeed, since it was 
written the play has been fully translated on at least 12 occasions into English, - versions which to a 
greater or lesser extent emphasised, minimised and occasionally supplemented the content of the 
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original work, subjecting it to what Heaney referred to as the ‘social and intellectual preoccupations’ of 
its translators – none of whom, to date, have been female.4 
 
Though many of these translations are grounded in a liberal, humanistic view of the work, early 
translations by Ussher5 (1926) and O’Shea6 (1897) were clearly shaped by ideas of nationalism and the 
need for an Irish identity while the translations by O’Connor (1945)7 and David Marcus (1953),8 both 
use the poem to attack the Catholic Church’s power in Irish society and the repression of sexuality 
occasioned by Catholic teaching. The result is that those authors stray somewhat from the original text, 
with Marcus in particular emphasising the sexuality of the poem’s main passages at the expense of the 
other themes.9   
Heaney’s translation (1993)10 meanwhile, specifically reads Merriman’s poem in the context of the 
feminist concerns emerging in Irish culture in the late 1980s and early 1990s, viewing it as “a paradigm 
of the war initiated by the women’s movement for women’s empowerment, their restoration to the 
centre of language and consciousness and thereby also to the centre of all institutions and functioning 
of society.”11 Similar views  underwrite Patrick C. Power’s earlier, and complete, translation (1971).12 
In its consideration of CMO, and in particular given its expressed aim of analysing the text through the 
lens of a feminist theory of law, this article eschews explicitly slanted translations and has reference to 
the more neutral versions of the work in the Irish language version produced edited by Ó’Murchú13 
(1982) and the most recent translation by Ciarán Carson, published in 2007.14 Carson’s expressed 
understanding of translation hinges on its central impossibility, and he thus seeks to illuminate through 
his version the inevitably incomplete and troubled relationship between original and translation, rather 
than imposing upon it a theory or view of the author’s original work. 
The analysis which follows thus compares two texts one written, and translated by a woman, and the 
other written, and repeatedly translated exclusively by men. It is thus subject to the subjectivities of 
translation and insight which the experiences of authors and translators of each gender bring to bear on 
the works at issue.  
A second, and no less fundamental difference, between the two works discussed and one which bears 
highlighting at the outset is that they are opposed in terms of genre. CMO is a satire which at times 
crosses into the realm of farce given its surreal setting, most notably in the verdict which the judge 
delivers at the poem’s conclusion. In contrast, AT is a tragedy characterised by a stark realism, 
unmitigated by moments of comedy. Though both texts ultimately seek to expose societal double 
standards in attitudes towards female sexuality, and agency, they do so in starkly different ways – and 
with varying complications for the reader as a result - as the final portion of this article analyses. 
Feminist Theories of Law 
 
Feminist theories of law are based in the belief that the law has been fundamental in the historical 
subordination of women and seeks to analyse and explain the manner in which the law has aided this 
subordination as well as looking to how the law might be used to remedy it.15 While the understandings 
of feminist legal theory are various, and in some cases divergent, four primary theories can be identified: 
liberal equality theories; sexual difference theories; anti-essentialist theories and, finally dominance 
theories. 
 
Theories which centre on liberal equality while they embrace the status quo of a rights-based approach 
to law, call for the revision or re-orientation of traditional liberal categorisations in order to account for 
their differential impacts on women and other marginalised groups.16 Sexual difference theories 
emphasise the role and significance of gender-discrimination and call for affirmative legal responses to 
counter such imbalances. Difference theories can thus conflict with more traditional approaches which 
seek to emphasise the same-ness of women17 while anti-essentialist theories take this argument a step 
further and call for a deconstruction of the idea that there is a single “female” voice which must be 
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vindicated and seeks to accommodate the differences in inequality which are experienced as between 
women of varying class, racial, sexual or socio-economic identities.18 
 
Finally, dominance theories reject liberal feminism and view the legal system as a mechanism for the 
perpetuation of male dominance and in this respect form a part of the broader school of critical legal 
studies.19 The dominance theory is perhaps most vocally and notably proposed by Catherine McKinnon 
who argues that women’s sexuality is socially constructed by male dominance and operates as the 
central means by which their subordination is achieved in society.20 In contrast to sexual difference 
theorists,21 dominance theorists, argue that the differences in treatment between the sexes result from 
‘the perspective that has been forced on women’ rather than any naturally occurring difference in 
capacity or social roles. 22 
 
Drawing an analogy with Marx’s theory of class struggle McKinnon argues that law is designed to 
facilitate men’s sexual access to women23 as part of a legal system which is designed to establish, or at 
a minimum to preserve, male power and which constructs understandings of femininity and sexuality 
to reinforce this, albeit unstated, aim.24 McKinnon’s work thus views traditional legal theory as unable 
to adequately reflect or accommodate the reality of female experience, leading to the necessity for 
women to generate a legal theory informed by the female experience and inclusive of female 
perspectives.25 
 
McKinnon’s work in feminist theory has, however, also described pornography as a civil rights 
violation and has been characterised by other feminist scholars as resulting in a censorship of female 
sexuality that runs counter to more recent feminist understandings of sexual equality by retrenching the 
categorisation as a woman as an identity indivisible from injury.26 This view, however, misinterprets 
McKinnon’s motivations in opposing pornography by conflating her opposition with an endorsement 
of previous views of pornography as violating "community standards" of sexual decency or modesty. 
McKinnon, as well as Andrea Dworkin, characterise pornography as problematic not because of its 
content but rather due to its functional operation as a form of dominance and have sought to enable 
women to seek damages under civil rights law when they can prove they had been harmed through its 
production, specifically inspired by contexts in which individuals who had previously acted in such 
materials had subsequently revealed they did so under coercion or duress.27  
 
In this respect, and as the final portion of this work examines, McKinnon’s work is ultimately oriented28 
on a need to recognise the institutional dominance of men at and in law, and to seek to re-orientate the 
institutions and laws which permit the resulting subordination of women.29 
 
Cúirt an Mheán Oíche 
 
CMO has been variously considered, the greatest comic work in Irish,30 “a dark flower of Irish 
literature”,31 and the product of a mind “soured and mocking […] lacking in the gentle qualities.”32 
Yeats in his consideration of the text lamented the lack of “a Gaelic scholar […] or failing that some 
man of known sobriety of manner and of mind […] to introduce to the Irish reading public this vital, 
extravagant, immoral, preposterous poem.”33 Yet, despite Yeats’ concerns that the poem would remain 
unknown to an English-speaking public, by the time of his statement the work had been translated at 
least twice into English (albeit apparently not to his liking), and was widely read and recited in its 
original Irish.34 
 
Indeed, the work was unusual in its popularity, forming part of a vibrant manuscript as well as oral 
tradition in Ireland with Ó Murchú arguing it “reached the zenith of its popularity in the first half of the 
nineteenth century.”35 It is estimated that there are more than one hundred hand copied versions of CMO 
in existence, attributable to some seventy-five scribes36 in various Irish dialects – evidence that the 
transcriptions have their origin in dictations taken from oral recounting of the story.37 This theory is 
favoured by scholars who note that the text would traditionally have been recited aloud.38 Indeed, 
accounts from the end of the nineteenth century note that residents of Co. Clare could recite large 
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portions of the text from memory some two centuries after its composition39 and contemporaneously it 
remains one of the Irish language’s most enduringly popular and intriguing texts.  
 
This is attributable, in part, to the work having proven to “be uniquely resistant to interpretation of a 
kind which would suggest that one has extracted a definitive interpretation from it”.40 Internal comment 
about the context of the work is scant and its content has permitted various translators and interpreters 
to find in its lines support for a wealth of ideas and themes. Despite this characterisation of the text as 
resistant to interpretation, the text has been consistently described as being pre-occupied with ideas of 
individual liberty both psychological and practical with Ó Crualaoich describing the theme of 
Merriman’s poem as ‘a civil and psychological liberation of the individual’41 while Eglinton, has 
described Merriman as the ‘Irish free-thinker of the eighteenth century.’42 Such comments are supported 
on even the most cursory examination of the text which emphasises ideas of freedom of choice and the 
social and functional constraints on its exercise. 
  
Context and Composition 
 
It is generally agreed that CMO was composed in East Clare, a rural area on Ireland’s West Coast in or 
around 1780 by Brian Merriman, a native Irish speaker, farmer and school teacher who lived and 
worked in East Clare and the nearby city of Limerick for the duration of his lifetime. Regardless of its 
precise date of composition, the text was authored in a period of Irish, and indeed world, history 
characterised by rapid political and social revolution and accompanying, often radical, shifts in 
philosophical thought. 
 
In particular, the period surrounding the text’s creation saw the revolutionary wars in France and the 
North American colonies, as well as the first hints at rebellion in Ireland which would culminate in the 
(failed) rebellion of the United Irishmen in 1798.43 The shifts in philosophical thinking which 
accompanied these revolutionary movements in their nascence and actualisation was no less significant. 
The decades surrounding the completion of CMO saw almost unprecedented levels of publishing on 
societal organisation with “The Social Contract” (1762) and the new constitutions of the United States 
and the French Republic coming shortly before the presumed date of the work’s completion while 
equally revolutionary works including a “A Vindication of the Rights of Women” (1792) came shortly 
thereafter. While Merriman lived and worked exclusively on Ireland’s west coast, the remarkable, and 
rapid shift in social attitudes to equality and self-determination which these events and publications 
represented could not but have had an impact on the author, in particular given his work with the Irish 
middle and gentry classes who traditionally sent their sons to continental Europe to be educated.44 
 
This international context must also be set against the situation closer to Merriman’s home. While the 
decades surrounding 1780 saw the repeal of some of Ireland’s penal laws through the Catholic Relief 
Acts45 full Catholic emancipation would remain elusive until the nineteenth century. In the interim, 
dissatisfaction with discriminatory laws and the perceived distance of the English government in Dublin 
from the general population remained high.46 The period also saw the first stirrings of debates 
particularly relevant to CMO concerning the punishment of “female” crimes such as infanticide and 
concealments of births.47 Entering into this milieu the themes raised by CMO are hardly surprising, 
indeed Ó’Murchú notes that Merriman appears to have captured the mood of the times well.48  
 
Structure and Content 
 
The poem opens with what has been characterised in some works as a parody of the traditional Irish 







Ba gnáth mé ag siúl le ciumhais na habhann 
Ar bháinseach úr’s an drúcht go trom 
In acide na gcoillte i gcoim an tsléibhe 
Gan mhairg gan mhoill ar shoilse an law50 
‘Twas my custom to stroll by a clear winding stream 
  With my boots full of dew from the lush meadow green 
Near a neck of the woods where the mountain holds sway 
Without danger or fear at the dawn of the day51 
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However, it is not clear that the view of the poem as a parody of the aisling is entirely accurate. 
Ó’Buachalla, for example, has noted that the work is not a parody but a “very effective” use of the old 
contrast raised by the aisling genre between the actual and desired state.52 According to Ó’Buachalla, 
the principal function of the aisling is to give literary expression to the prophetic statement  – the 
purpose is not to encounter the spéirbhean but to receive her message53 and so while the political 
message with which such poems were infused was subject to change over time the mechanism remained 
the same – as is the case in CMO.54 The visual imagery invoked by the author is, however, certainly 
less romantic a traditional aisling in which an idealised female encounters a reciprocally augmented 
male hero.55  
 
Setting the tone for the work which is to follow, in CMO’s opening lines the poet is roused not by the 
incarnation of a shackled Ireland appealing to the poet to free her but by a ferocious, ugly hag twenty 
feet tall.  Her cloak dragging through the mud and armed with a bailiff’s staff, she shouts of her 
dissatisfaction with the poet and announces she has come to bring him before the Midnight Court, ruled 













   
  
The hag indicts the lack of freedom, insecure tenure and unfair legal system in Ireland proffering the 












This subversive vision of the female court convened and power balance inverted amid the decay of the 
country’s “normal” institutions continues through the work.65 Brought before the Court, the poet finds 









Do chonairc me chum le ciumhais an chuain 
An mhásach bholgach tholgach thaibhseach  
[…] 
Sé nó seacht do shlata is fuílleach 
Péirse beacht dá brat ag sraoilleach 
Léi sa tslab le drab is ríobal58 
 
‘Muscail, corraigh, a chodlataigh ghránna, 
Is dubhach do shlí bheith snte id shliasta  
Is Cúirt ‘na suí is na mílte ag trial ann59  
A female approached from the side of the quay, 
Broad arsed and big-bellied, built like a tank  
[…] 
Of some twenty-one feet while the hem of her dress 
Trailed five yards behind, through the mire and the 
muck57 
 
Rouse yourself, stir yourself, sluggard awake! 
Shame on you, blame on you, slumped on your ear, 
While court is convened and thousands draw near!60 
 
Ní cúirt gan acht gan reacht gan riail, 
Ná cúirt na gcreach mar chleacht tú riamh 
An chúirt seo ghluais ó shluaite séimhe,    
Ach city na dtrua, na mbua is na mbéithe61   
Gan sealbh gan Saoirse ag síolrach seanda, 
Ceannas I ndlí ná cíos ná ceannphoirt,     
Scriosadh an tír is níl na ndiaidh   
In ionad na luibheanna acht flíoch is 
fiaile,63     
Not a court without standing, or statute, or code, 
Nor an imported court of the plundering mode, 
But a court that is ruled by a civilised throng, 
Where the weak are empowered and the women are 
strong.62 
An old race indeed without freedom or land 
Without rights to its rent, and its leaders all banned, 
The rich farmlands ruined, their bounty replaced 
By brambles and nettles and fields full of waste64 
 
[…] chaointais choir seo. 
Falsacht dlí do chloí go comhachtach, 
Seasamh i dteannta fann is fánlaig 
Is caithfidh an teann bheith ceansa tláith ligh 
Caithfidh an neart gan ceart ‘na ceart bheith 
suite.66 
[…] to wipe out all iniquitous laws  
To stand on the side of the poor and the weak 
To ensure that the mighty become mighty meek 
The power to be sheared from the powers that be 
And due right restore to its rightful degree67 
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The Judge pledges no favour or bias will “trample on law as is often the case”68 and reasserts both the 
jurisdiction and authority of the Midnight Court to hear the matter that is brought before it69 given the 
absence of Ireland’s leaders.70 The emphasis on the indigenous, sovereign nature of the Court’s 
constitution, and the concerns which it is charged to settle are notable in the socio-legal context of the 
work. Although removed in time from the “The Flight of the Earls” (1607) and Jacobite-Williamite 
wars (1689–1691), CMO is set in a country which, though experiencing a period of relative calm, was 
nevertheless characterised by repeated clashes between indigenous and English landholders and 
cyclical, violent protests against English rule, given frequent and famous expression through 
literature.71  
 
Indeed, Woulfe in his translation specifically notes and emphasises that the destruction of Gaelic 
civilisation was still fresh and alive in cultural memory at the time of Merriman’s writing and 
particularly so in Co. Clare. Woulfe, himself a schoolmaster in East Clare and Limerick in early 1800s 
was well placed to make such an observation.72 Equally, Ó’Murchú, has argued that, in its emphasis on 
rights and law, CMO’s language points to the absence of both in the context of the oppression 
occasioned by contemporaneous legal and Parliamentary activities in Dublin.73 Heaney also sees the 
Court, not only as a fantasy of feminist justice but as a court which sought to reassert the order and 
legitimacy which the penal laws and more general institutional neglect had deprived the country of at 
the time of writing.74  
 
More broadly the Judge in CMO contextualises the Court as one which has been called upon in a country 
whose official institutions have decayed and where indigenous leadership has fallen away. Worse still, 
the people are unable to turn to the law as a means of redress in the context of the work, as both the 










    
 
Following these opening assertions of the Court’s role and function, the narrative unfolds through the 
judicial statements and testimony of the plaintiff and her respondent as well as the Judge. The parties – 
a young woman supposed to represent the women of Ireland, and an old man (who volunteers to account 
for the behaviour of the men of the country) testify before the Court in turn.  The young woman, as 
plaintiff, speaks first, putting her case to the court. She despairs of her unmarried state and the fact that 








Responding to the plaintiff, the old man characterises the women of Ireland through their proxy plaintiff 






Doilbheadh dúr an dúcheilt dlíthe, 
An fann gan feidhm ná faighidh ó éinne, 
Acht clampar doimhin is loighe chum léirscris, 
Flsacht fear dlí is fachnaoideairdnirt, 
Cam is calaois, faille is fábhar, 
Scamall an dlí agus fíordhath fannchirt, 
Dalladh le bríb, le fís, le falsacht.75 
 
When justice lies shackled her laws disarrayed 
The weak are enfeebled, infallibly tied 
To a future of fraud where no fairness abides.  
Duplicitous liars and crooks on the bench, 
Hush money, slush funds, and all conscience 
quenched 
Where backhanders buy you a piece of the judge, 
And everyone knows that the law is as judge.76 
 
Cúis do chráigh me is d’fhág me cloíte […] 
Ah fuaid an tsaoil seo d’fhírscoth béithe 
Ina gcailleacha ducha gan cumhdach céile […] 
A Cháidh na Carraige breathain go bíogthach 
Mná na Banba in anacra suíte78 
 
The pain that has drained all my get-up-and-go […] 
Is the number of girls with no hope of a match […] 
O your grace! Please consider our feminine case, 
That the women of Ireland find men a disgrace,77 
 
Is fíor gur feasach me farairí Fódla 
Suíte greamaithe ag sladairí ‘on tsórt seo.  
[…] 
Is search lem chroí an uair chím im radhairc í, 
A gradam, a críoch, a poimp ‘s a taibhse80 
I know or a fact that the men of the nation 
Are often ensnared by these pros of predation;  
[…] 
It sickens by happiness, seeing her strut 
With her nose in the air, when I know she’s a slut81 
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His proposal to resolve their complaint offers little to further endear him to the reader nor, one suspects, 
to the audience in the Court. Rather than addressing the alleged behaviour of the country’s men he 
suggests the abolition of illegitimacy.82 The plight of the women of Ireland in the old man’s account 
will be served by their complete liberation from marriage and the adoption of free love.83  
 
Having listened to the old man’s argument, the female petitioner gets to her feet once more to respond 
to the old man. She berates him for criticising Ireland’s women and exposes his own shortcomings 
emphasising the social and financial desperation which forces women – including the old man’s own 
wife to marry or face destitution.84 Finally, and most controversially for many audiences, the young 
woman questions clerical celibacy given the role of marriage in the Biblical texts.85 
 
















The trial ends and poet finds to his horror that he is to be first man to suffer such a fate as the crowd of 




First produced in September 1964, some 184 years after CMO, An Triail (AT) is a drama written by 
Máiréad Ní Ghráda who was raised in a breac-gaeltacht (an area whose population contains a 
proportion of native, daily Irish speakers) in East Clare, near the area where Merriman himself spent 
much of his life. It is tempting to wonder about cross pollination between these two authors, who were 
born and lived in such close proximity, albeit nearly two centuries apart and while there is no evidence 
that Ní Ghráda was directly influenced by Merriman, to assert that she was not at least familiar with the 
work would be naïve.  
 
Certainly, both works use legal settings to expose the hypocrisy and injustice of the societies in which 
they are set. Moreover, both works have remained shocking to audiences since their creation. AT’s first 
production, as part of the Dublin Theatre Festival alongside Brian Friel’s “Philadelphia Here I come” 
in 1965 was proceeded by a controversial series of articles in the Irish Times on the treatment of single 
mothers and following its first performance became a subject of national discussion, prompting letters 
to the Irish Times.88 Since then, the work has remained current, and has been adapted for television and 
radio as well as featuring of the Leaving Certificate Irish syllabus for state exams in the country since 
2006.89 
 
As with CMO the text of AT, after a brief prologue, is structured as a trial, with each character called to 
offer testimony and face cross-examination as they would be in court. The work follows Máire, a 
schoolgirl, who after falling pregnant outside marriage following an affair with a married school teacher 
Gheimbhimse díreach  bhrí chum buaite 
Is feidim id chainste, a chrídeach 
bhuartha  
Síolrach Órla, Mhóire is Mheidhbhe 
An seifteoir caol’s an créatúir cladartha 
Achtaimid mar dhlí do bhéithe 
An seacht fó trí gan cuibhreach céile 
[…]  
feannaigí a dhrom ‘s a chom le corda86 
I find I’m persuaded by all you have said,  
[…] 
That the offspring of Orla, and Mór and of Medbh, 
Are con men and shysters, and phonies and fakes, 
[…] 
Al fighting like mad for control of the shop. 
I therefore establish these laws for your state: 
If he’s one year and twenty and still has no mate,  
[...] 
his back shall be flayed with a whopping great 
whip.87 
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is forced to leave the family home. After settling in Dublin Máire moves unsuccessfully between jobs, 
facing discrimination for her status as a single mother before, driven by desperation, murdering her 
child and taking her own life. 
 
As the curtain is raised Máire’s voice admits to the murder, 
 
Mharaigh mé mo leanbh de bhrí dur cailín í. Fásann gach cailín suas ina bean. Ach tá 
m’iníon soar [...] Ní bheidh sí ina hóinsín bhog ghéíliúil ag aon fear.90   
 
I killed my child because she was a girl. Every girl grows into a woman. But my 
daughter is free … She won’t be any man’s obedient little fool. 
 
The Attorney then takes the stage and asks the audience, sitting as jury, to put from their minds what 
they have heard or read about the case, and to listen instead to the evidence that is presented to them 
and to give their judgment on that evidence and that evidence alone, 
 
A uaisle, iarraim é seo oraibh – aon ní atá cloister agaibh, nó aon ní atá léite agaibh 
[…] a chur as bhur n-aigne […] An príosúnach a bheidh os bhur gcomhair tá coir 
uafásach á cur ina leith.91 
 
Ladies and gentlemen, I ask you this – anything you have heard, or anything you have 
read […] cast it from your minds […] The prisoner that will be before you today is 
accused of a terrible crime. 
 
The Attorney then calls each of the work’s characters in turn as witnesses to deliver their portions of 
the story. Yet, as in a trial, their testimony is not delivered unchallenged. In fact, the narrative presented 
is striking for its use of the character of the Attorney to repeatedly challenge the narratives the witnesses 
seek to construct. Máire’s brothers Liam and Seán92 are called to the stand and under cross examination 
repeatedly assert the blame should not be placed with them for what happened,  
 
Liam: Ach ní ormsa is cóir aon phioc den mhilleán a chur […] Ní fhéadfainn a bheith 
ag a sála sin i gcónaí. Ní mise a coimeadaí.93 
 
But the blame shouldn’t fall on me […] I couldn’t be always at her heels. I’m not 
her keeper 
 
Seán: Can a d’fhéadfainn a dhéanamh? […] Tharraing sí siúd náire orainn. Tharraing 
sí náire shaolta orainn […] Loit sí an saol orainn.94 
 
What could I do? […] She brought shame on us, huge shame […] She ruined our 
lives. 
 
Under further questioning from the Attorney it becomes clear that both of Máire’s brothers, far from 
being concerned about having failed to help their sister, are pre-occupied only with the personal cost of 
the events to them.95 
 
Liam: Bhris Beití an cleamhnas a rinneadh dúinn. Níor fhéad sí an phoiblíocht a 
sheasamh 
 
Betty broke the match that had been made for us. She couldn’t stand the attention. 
 
Seán: Náirigh sí sinn. Bhí orm éirí as an tsagartóireacht. Ní fhéadfainn aghaidh a 
thabhairt ar mo chomrádaithe sa choláiste 
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She shamed us. I had to leave my training for the priesthood. I couldn’t face my 
classmates 
 
The social worker,96 and Máire’s previous employer all of whom play peripheral roles in the play and 
who claim to be charitable at first instance are similarly exposed under cross-examination.97 The 
previous employers dismissed Máire as soon as they discovered her pregnancy and capitalised on her 
vulnerability by under-paying her while the social worker dismissed her desire to keep her child, and 
the details of the birth private as an indication of Máire’s “stubborn, headstrong” (“stuacach, 
ceanndána”) nature.98 
 
The use of cross-examination to unearth a more complex narrative than is initially presented by the 
characters is perhaps most effectively deployed in undermining the narrative constructed by Máire’s 
mother whose double standards in relation to female sexuality are rather ruthlessly exposed by the 
Attorney. In the face of the mother’s denial of responsibility and complaints of the shame Máire drew 
on the family the Attorney points out that it is the attention rather than the activity itself which seems 
to be at issue, 
 
Attorney: Tuairim na gcomharsan is mó atá ag déanamh buartha duit? 
 
It’s the opinion of your neighbours you’re most concerned about?  
 
Attorney: Fiarfraím duit ar thaispeáin tú grá máthar nó carthanacht chróístaí do 
d’iníon nuair a bhí sí I dtrioblóid? 
 
I ask you, did you show your daughter a mother’s love or Christian charity when she 
was in trouble?99 
 
The audience has at this point been made aware of a further hypocrisy – that Máire’s mother attempted 
to make Máire abort her child in order to spare her family the ignominy of a daughter bearing a child 
outside marriage.100 
 
Nor are the Attorney’s own attitudes spared from exposure through the process of cross-examination. 
Mailí, a prostitute who befriends Máire and offers her and her child a place to live, is one of the few 
characters in the play whose testimony accurately reflects her actions. However, in questioning her, the 
Attorney’s own dim view of women who express, and use, their sexuality for their own gain is exposed 
as he implies that Mailí’s home was no fit place for a child.101 It is a stark reminder within the work of 
the many levels, and the institutionalised nature of the  discrimination women faced where they were 
perceived as using or expressing their sexuality in ways not deemed “appropriate” according to 
contemporary social mores. 
 
Significantly, the father of Máire’s child is never called as a witness during the trial. While this may be 
because Máire indicates repeatedly during the course of the work that she has never revealed his identity 
to anyone, the narrative does reveal him to the audience who take on the role of jury from the play’s 
opening. It is thus unclear whether his absence from the trial is a necessary component of maintaining 
the fiction that his identity remains a secret within the walls of the work, or more significantly (and 
more temptingly) whether his absence is intended as a comment by the author that fathers in such 
circumstances were not called to answer for their role or to bear responsibility for their actions. 
 
Gender and Feminist Legal Theories in the Texts 
 
Given the context of the texts it is now necessary to turn to ask how they can be understood through the 
lens of feminist legal theory. Certainly, as is clear from the summaries provided above, both texts are 
centred on primary, female characters who grapple with the absence of female agency that characterises 
their worlds. Equally both texts use legal settings, dominated by men, to explore the narratives of their 
central characters, to examine how they have sought to seize the agency denied to them and to highlight 
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the consequences which flow from their failed attempts to liberate themselves from the restrictions 
imposed by their gender.  
 
The reader will recall from the opening portions of this article that McKinnon argues that in the 
dominance theory of law, the law is designed to facilitate men’s sexual access to women102 as part of a 
broader social system which is designed to establish and preserve, male power.103 In the face of this, 
McKinnon argues that women must seek to establish a new theory of law informed by female 
experience.104 
 
This portion of the article now turns to examine both texts through the lens of this dominance theory as 
propounded by McKinnon and argues that both texts offer a nascent (though not unqualified) theory of 
law as a feminist endeavour. In particular, the article argues in this portion that the use of dialogue to 
interrogate the understandings of truth presented by their characters, the portrayal of thwarted agency 
and the inversion of traditional institutional schemes used to varying degrees by both works contribute 
to the creation of narratives which are distinctly feminist in their attempts to re-articulate justice to give 
voice to oppressed, and female perspectives. 
 
The contrast between CMO and AT is most stark in its use of courtroom dialogues. The courtroom 
dialogues in AT are central to the work’s layered narrative in which the reliability of the various 
narrators and the accounts they give are constantly questioned. Through this method the more 
fundamental contradictions underpinning the attitudes of the characters (and the institutions they 
represent) to female sexuality and agency are exposed.  
 
Through its use of the Attorneys’ interjections, the dialogue in AT offers the audience qualified 
narratives where truth is unevenly distributed and uncertain. Sitting as the jury the audience are still 
limited by what can be known (the most evident example being the absence of the father of Máire’s 
child from the proceedings) and are thus restrained from radical judgments on the relative blame of the 
parties. Instead the audience is forced to identify a truth which exists between the narratives presented, 
the hypocrisies exposed on cross-examination and those insights which they receive through individual 
scenes.  
 
In contrast, in CMO the largely unopposed testimony leaves the audience to choose between two 
opposing and highly oppositional dialogues, and while the old man and young woman contradict each 
other in turn, the accounts they offer adding little nuance to the narrative presented to the Court. As a 
result, the Court at the conclusion of CMO when asked to choose the successful party – and thus 
designate their account as the truth for the purposes of the work – is faced with a stark choice between 
two narratives almost wholly at odds with each other. The audience is, equally, left to parse a narrative 
defined by its extremes rather than its capacity to expose the more insidious implications of the 
perceptions and beliefs about sexual expression and female agency that the characters hold. It is 
tempting to argue that in forcing the reader (and the Court) to make this choice between two stark, and 
flawed, accounts the work forces a consideration of the flawed nature of the narratives the law presents 
- and whether the truth which can be identified within such accounts. Yet, by forcing an extreme choice, 
as part of an already surreal setting, CMO risks rendering the legitimate issue of female agency which 
the work identifies, as ridiculous and extreme as the setting in which it is discussed.  
 
The strength of AT, in contrast, is that it succeeds in reflecting one of the central conceits of the legal 
system namely its human fallibility and the ambiguous allegiance which courtroom narratives have to 
neatly delineated truths.105 Decisions in court can be made only on the evidence presented, and the full 
truth rarely emerges- perhaps not even to the parties themselves. In this respect the structure of both 
works establishes a basis on which to query whose interests the institution of law serves, and positions 
the works to examine whether the law – in fact – serves to retrench the dominance of those who designed 
it, rather than exposing a liberating truth which can alter lived realities. 
 
Using these dialogic methods the works, in their exploration of female agency, echo Judith Baer’s 
sentiment that “women are more vulnerable and more responsible than men, but they are less free.”106 
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Both female protagonists face significant pressure to fulfil their expected gender role - more so than the 
men of either text who admit they are not similarly pressured in the case of Máire’s brothers107 or have 
simply shirked their responsibilities, as is the case with the men accused in CMO and the father of 
Máire’s child. 
 
In addition to experiencing this enhanced burden, the women of both texts are also more vulnerable 
where they fail to meet these expectations. In the dialogue of the female protagonist in CMO the 
audience hears not only the prejudices of the character herself in her depiction of other women as 
undeserving of husbands but also the prejudices of the society of which she is a part.  
 
Similarly, in her plea for a judgment obliging the men of Ireland to marry, CMO’s central character 
presents the audience with a claim implicit in which subsists a deeply practical fear for survival in a 
world in which single women could have little economic or political existence independent of their 
male relatives.108 Similarly, Máire (though admittedly naïve), and her mother, understand marriage as 
the surest means of securing their own and her daughters’ futures. 
 
Mother: caithfidh sé tú a phósadh109 
 
He has to marry you 
 
Máire: cuir tú fáinne ar mo mhéar. ‘Leis an bhfáinne seo déanaim thú a phósadh’ dúirt tú.110 
 
You put a ring on my finger. ‘With this ring I thee wed’ you said. 
 
The apparent lack of remorse, combined with the pride and conviction displayed both by Máire in AT 
and the plaintiff in CMO compound their offences in the eyes of the societies of which they are a part. 
Máire is seen as having brought her end upon herself because she is “stuacach ceanndána” (stubborn, 
headstrong) while the plaintiff in CMO is portrayed as deluded and vindictive.111 In this respect it is 
interesting that both characters are portrayed through the narratives offered by others as having forfeited 
their right to appear as victims because they have violated the rules designated to control their behaviour 
in society, rendering them acutely vulnerable as a result. As one of the characters in AT articulates,  
 
[…] bhris sí na rialacha.  She broke the rules.  
An té a bhriseann rialacha an chluiche     The person who breaks the rules 
cailltear ann é 112                loses the game. 
 
The women at the heart of both texts – driven to their actions by desperation in societies which offer 
them no other means of redress or escape are condemned for failing to conform to their expected gender 
roles and are socially and economically marginalised as a result. Both women are also, in the end, 
helpless to prevent their categorisation by legal and social contexts whose preferences reflect their 
architects’ gender.113 Máire’s stand against the patriarchal institutions she finds herself facing is 
ultimately self-destructive, and while the plaintiff in CMO is vindicated to some extent, her victory is 
only symbolic – she remains constrained by a system which requires women to seek security through 
marriage, albeit they will be permitted by the Judge to beat a proposal from reluctant men.  
 
The result is that the complaints of the protagonists in CMO and AT have little impact on the men or 
the male institutions against which they are directed. The Attorneys seem unable to contextualise 
Máire’s crime as part of her social abandonment, her alienation from her family, or the antipathy of her 
child’s father. The blame that is laid at the feet of the other characters has little impact on their 
preferences – her brothers remain pre-occupied with their loss of social status while the father of her 
child remains aloof from, perhaps even unaware of, the proceedings having denied a wish to even see 
his child.114   
 
In CMO, while the male narrator is to be beaten, it is beyond the Court’s power to create a system in 
which women are not dependent on men. The solution suggested by the male protagonist, that women 
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should be “as free as” men and illegitimate children welcomed seems unlikely to provide the female 
plaintiff with the autonomy and security she seeks through marriage, instead imposing additional social 
costs on women while further freeing the male characters. Indeed, O’Neill has noted this, pointing out 
that the solution proposed by the old man in CMO empowers him and those like him far more than the 










Both works starkly illustrate, in their failure to hold to account their central male characters, and their 
illumination of the disproportionate compliance burdens to which their female characters are subject, 
the dominance of the male point of view. Yet, what is still more notable is the treatment by the works 
of the institutional aspect of law and its reluctance or inability to enable the women who are subject to 
it, to escape the injustices which stem from the strictures of their gender.  
 
Elizabeth Butler Cullingford is perhaps the most explicit in her view of CMO as providing a “parody 
inversion of normal legal practice, a Bakhtinian world turned upside down in which women are on top 
[… and] desire is sanctioned rather than restrained by law.”118 Certainly if this view is correct CMO 
represents an example of dominance theory in action – of the traditionally male institution of law, re-
orientated to account for the feminine viewpoint. Yet despite Cullingford’s characterisation, the texts 
are not so clear cut in their institutional articulations or their attempts to give voice to female 
perspectives. 
 
Heaney thus notes that while he certainly views CMO as a distinctively feminist text which contains “a 
tremor of the future”, in particular in light of its use from Marcus’ translation onwards, as an ally in the 
war against repressive sexual morality and censorship, it is nevertheless a text which falls short of 
contemporary views of gender equality.119 In particular, the characterisation of women in the text as 
constantly seeking the support and protection of men, despite its subversive intent, sits uneasily with 
modern readers.120 
 
Thus, while it is possible to argue that Merriman was a revolutionary writer it is equally possible to 
contend that he was a conventional one. Heaney dismisses Máirín de Burca’s more strident opinion of 
the work as illustrative of the fact that “[m]en cannot write intelligently about women's oppression” and 
her description of CMO as “sexist rubbish.”121 In opposing this view, Heaney notes that despite a 
portrayal that is not without complications for modern readers, Merriman shows remarkable empathy 
and insight in being able to place himself in the dock and outline the case against the men of Ireland to 
begin with.122  
 
This is, it is argued, the more appropriate view. In particular given that, in as much as the portrayals of 
women offered by the text are concerned, the genre of the work becomes significant. The woman who 
testifies to the Midnight Court is idealised, portrayed as overcome by her emotions and suffering from 









Meilleadh mar iad le riail gan éifeacht, 
Scaoil achodladh gan chochall gan chuibhreach 
Síol an bhodaigh ‘s an mhogallfhuil mháiteach,  
[…] 
Fógair féilteach tré gach tíortha,  
D’óg is d’aosta saorthoil síolraigh.117 
Abolish this law that’s the plague of our nation! 
Release from their bondage both beggar and squire 
Be they born in a mansion, or farmhouse, or byre,  
[…] 
Free love for us all, for young and for old!116 
Is buarieamh suite fíor ‘na féachaint, 
Fuinneamh ‘na radharc is faghaity ‘na súile 
Is fiuchadh le draighean oilc aighnis fúthu, 
A caint dá cosc le loscadh léibh, 
[…] 
Is í ag greadadh na lámh ‘s ag fáscadh a ladhar. 
Insan uair a ghoil sí folcaí fíochmhar 
Is d’fhuscail osnaí gothaí a cainte124 
 
For the quarrel behind [her eyes] was hard to 
conceal. 
Her breast heaved in spasms, confounding her 
speech, 
So deep was her feeling, the words beyond reach, 
[…] 
Wringing the joints of her elegant hands, 
While the tide of her misery flowed down her 
cheek, 
Til finally sorrow allowed her to speak.123 
 






The implication of her testimony, which crosses the line into explicit motivation in some places, is that 
the women of Ireland must be married or be incomplete. Yet similar exaggeration is employed for comic 
effect throughout – and is the mechanism through which Merriman is freed to articulate controversial 
and taboo subjects of female sexuality and autonomy through the characters in the work.  
 
This is where the critique of de Burca finds its root. The genre that allows Merriman space to articulate 
these controversial ideas also renders the work apparently un-feminist in some respects. Most notably, 
in the closing lines of the work the Court reveals that its version of justice for women means merely a 
reversal of existing biases to achieve justice at the expense of men – rather than a true equality, a point 
noted by McKibben in her analysis of the work as an aisling.125 The judgment that the women of Ireland 
should flog the men of Ireland where they refuse to take up their social responsibility to marry and have 
children is, at its foundation, little more than a crude inversion of the models of legally sanctioned and 
gendered violence which characterised the treatment of women in Merriman’s own time.  
 
Indeed, from the moment the Queen steps up to deliver judgment and CMO’s narrative begins to 
conclude the writing loses much of its earlier force. While this might be attributable to the natural 
conclusion of the work, O’Connor has opined that it was intended that at that this point “Merriman 
would speak through [the Queen], and express his own convictions about life, but something went 
wrong.”126 Whether and what precisely “went wrong” is not clear though Ó Tuama claims the loss of 
focus results simply from the fact that Merriman had nothing further to add, lamenting that, in the end, 
the poem’s style hinders Merriman from achieving an appropriately climactic and dark expression  of 
his feelings.127  
 
Certainly in its earlier portions the comedic tone of the poem is matched by a strident, if often implicit, 
critique. However, at its conclusion this latter element falls away with the result that the comedy in the 
Queen’s judgment deflects but cannot quite diffuse the conflict which the preceding verses have 
established. Heaney put it more evocatively when he stated that through the poems earlier force “an 
archaic beast has been stirred under the poem’s surface and the reader experiences a vague need to see 
it unleased into action,” a need which is not actualised.129 
 
The result is that it becomes unclear whether the author thinks it is laughable that women should be 
thus treated or laughable that anyone should claim a different system is preferable. As a matter of 
authorial intention the answer is hard to locate – and perhaps deliberately so given the controversial 
nature of the topics considered. Indeed, it may be that the extreme inversion of the institutional 
preferences which is given voice in the Queen’s judgment is designed to highlight the existing 
institutional biases by illuminating the gender-based violence and duress which the law in Merriman’s 
world sanctifies. Indeed, it seems the ending to the work is almost deliberately drawn in a manner which 
evades an analyst’s attempt to articulate it as part of a feminist understanding of justice.  
 
In contrast, in AT, though there is no explicit inversion of the institutional structure of the Court within 
the work, there is a more subtle subversion of the narrative the male Attorneys seek to establish through 
the trial, and of the understanding of guilt the law seeks to impose on Máire. The combination of the 
uncertain narratives created through cross-examination, as well as Máire’s own voiced lines confessing 
to the crime at the outset of the work, as well as the occasional scenes revealed to the audience alone of 
Máire’s life before her death expose an underlying context which is more complex than the trial 
proceedings can hope to articulate. The result, is a dramatic illustration of the shortcomings of the justice 
system in appreciating the causes and consequences of Máire’s actions before and after her crime – and 
by implication, the inability of a system of law administered by men, to fully comprehend the female 
experience. 
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Both texts illustrate the dominance theory in as much as they use courtroom dialogues to expose the 
dominance of men in the lives of central female characters who struggle to assert their agency against 
male institutions. Indeed, the texts are both underwritten by the relationships of their female 
protagonists to the men they might marry, their language spent seeking to expose (CMO) or entreat 
(AT) the central male characters for the treatment the female characters must secure to survive.  
 
In this respect both texts appear to treat the law as having failed to adequately reflect or accommodate 
female experience (in AT), or as seeking to redress the failure of traditional courts to vindicate the 
interests of women (CMO), making it necessary for women to seek to re-create or re-articulate the law 
in order to accommodate their reality, and perspectives. The texts thus treat the law as a system through 
which meaning is reflected and constructed, as part of an authorised patriarchal discourse.130 It is 
perhaps unsurprising that the central female characters of both texts appear somewhat melodramatic in 
this context – exposed to the dilemma of the female speaker asked to express through the patriarchal 
categories of legal language the wrongs they have suffered, they reflect Hardy’s articulation of the 
difficulty experienced by women in seeking to express their feelings “in language which is chiefly made 
by men to express theirs”.131 
 
This is more starkly reflected in CMO where the court system which the audience of the era would have 
been familiar with was one which was discretionary and decentralised, presided over by local 
magistrates without formal legal training and in which social judgments played a more dominant role 
than in the formal, institutionalised system of justice seen in AT.132 This informality, and the lack of 
cross examination, sets the battle of narratives presented by the parties in CMO, supported only by the 
social standing of the speakers, as a stark struggle between the relative value and authority of male and 
female narratives. Meanwhile, in AT, the male Attorneys, while they appear to undermine parts of the 
testimony of the characters who come before the Court, ultimately present the audience with a male 
lens through which to view Máire and her crimes and present the struggles of the central female 
characters from a male point of view, while deploying the language of the courtroom to bolster its (and 
their) credibility as a neutral institution. 
Ultimately MacKinnon's dominance theory is concerned with precisely this dynamic - why the law has 
been particularly effective both in devaluing women’s narratives but also how the law has obscured its 
role in doing so through the deployment of unquestioned assertions of its own neutrality.133 In this light, 
the fundamental strength of AT in its presentation of a feminist theory of law emerges in the play’s final 
lines. After confessing her crimes to the audience/jury Máire tries to explain her actions with the simple 
statement “my daughter is free”134 in a bleak admission that women are unable to escape living in a 
system orientated to cater to male experience. In response to a system which denies female agency the 
text’s dramatic irony lies in Máire’s attempt to liberate her daughter and herself through an act which 
deprives them both of the very agency she desires for them and condemns her in the eyes of the law.  
CMO is somewhat more challenging. In his analysis of the poem O’Neill has noted that, in fact, the 
period of writing was (contrary to the work’s own characterisation) one in which relatively open 
attitudes to sexuality and pregnancy predominated.135 O’Neill argues that the poem should thus be 
understood as a reaction to changing societal order in which social class became more stratified and 
poorer, landless farmers who traditionally married early struggled to integrate with, and thus became 
socially alienated from, the landed peasantry who increasingly married later and whose adoption of the 
dowry system shifted power to landholding, farming males thus affecting gender relations.136  In this 
context O’Neill argues that the men on trial in CMO are subject to censure not because they are men 
but because they have offended against the mores of the previous traditional and communal society.137 
 
In it not clear that O’Neill’s analysis is entirely correct as a matter of socio-legal history. Dowry systems 
and the associated power of landowning males had long existed in a relatively similar form in Gaelic 
society. Moreover, while the system of marriage through the payment of a traditional bride price 
(coibhche) had diminished by the sixteenth century it had been replaced by the payment of a dowry as 
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early as 1400 in many parts of the country138 with non-dowry marriage common only until the eighth 
century, and largely a means of acquiring, secondary wives of low status, and concubines.139 
 
In that context, while a delay in marriage may have occurred demographically, and may indeed add an 
additional class-based element to the narrative presented through the complaints of the characters in 
CMO, the idea that the text represents an attempt to re-assert a previously more equitable distribution 
of power between men and women in marriage is not supported by legal. Nevertheless, through its 
fundamental re-orientation (albeit in a surreal setting) of the structure and aims of the Court as 
matriarchal, and given its recurrent emphasis on themes of female agency and free expression of female 





In both texts, broader truths about the limits of female sexual expression and female agency linger 
beneath the surface of the narratives which are presented – simultaneously simpler yet more elusive 
than the examples which are given by the characters in the texts. In this respect the works highlight the 
difficult allure of narrative in both literature and law – creating a line of argument which seeks to remain 
faithful to truth while simultaneously telling stories which are often mutually exclusive, and are 
frequently the simplest or more approachable examples of far more complex societal conflicts.140 It is 
not only that the narrators in the texts are unreliable, but far more fundamentally, that neither law (as 
institutionally sanctioned storytelling) nor literature can know the truth with any more certainty than 
the parties to whom they give a voice.  
 
And yet the institutional veneer of the law in both texts demonstrates the potential of the law to elevate 
courtroom narratives and those institutional and individual forces who articulate them above reproach, 
crafting the truth society wants to remember into precedents the court cannot forget and constructing 
narratives of guilt and innocence whose value is, like the narratives established in literature, measured 
by their endurance.  
 
The danger of this exercise, as both CMO and AT expose, is not only the erasure or flattening of the 
truth which such articulation permits but also that the narratives constructed by law can, and do, 
emphasise the views and experiences of those who write and administer the law. In both texts, this 
results in a failure to reflect the nuanced reality of the challenges and demands which female 
protagonists encounter, both in terms of the burden placed on them to align their behaviour with 
traditional gender roles, and the formal and informal penalties they face where they fail to do so. The 
result is that the law in both texts “is sung … in a low pitch” prioritising male viewpoints over female 
experience, in a way which both authors expose as part of their texts to advocate more and less explicitly 
for a more nuanced understanding of the dominance of male perspectives in judicial processes.141 
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